Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground in American Jurisprudence by Lavoie, Richard L.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Publications The School of Law
January 2005
Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to
Reach a Middle Ground in American
Jurisprudence
Richard L. Lavoie
University of Akron Law School, rll21@uakron.edu
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The School of Law at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Publications by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lavoie, Richard L., "Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground in American
Jurisprudence" (2005). Akron Law Publications. 125.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications/125
 611 
ACTIVIST OR AUTOMATON: THE INSTITUTIONAL NEED 




The recent political season saw the idea of judicial activism 
regularly trotted out as an electioneering boogeyman at all levels of 
government—from local judicial races to the Presidency of the 
United States.1  A common theme is that activist judges regularly 
overturn the will of the people by “legislating from the bench.”  Such 
rogue jurists twist the law in a manner that usurps the role of the 
legislature and thwarts the popular will in favor of the judges’ 
personal views.  On the other side, one sometimes hears equally 
strident claims that limiting the judiciary to literalist modes of 
statutory interpretation transforms judges into mere automatons,  
 
* This essay is based on a transcript of the author’s remarks made at the Albany Law Review 
Symposium, Issues Facing the Judiciary, which was held at Albany Law School on October 
28, 2004.  These remarks were based upon the author’s prior scholarship on this topic.  See 
Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical 
Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115 (2004). 
** Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Texas at Austin School of Law; Dartmouth 
College, A.B.; Cornell University, J.D.; New York University, L.L.M. (Taxation). 
1 See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein, Senate Rivals Court Key Voters Down East, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2004, at A1 (identifying judicial activism as an issue used 
to motivate North Carolinians to vote in the hotly-contested U.S. Senate race for John 
Edwards’s open seat); Editorial, Courting Consistency, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 2004, at 
10A (applauding voters for effectively putting an end to an era of judicial activism by the Ohio 
Supreme Court); Jannell McGrew, Roy Moore Backer Holds Lead, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, 
Nov. 3, 2004, at A6 (describing the platform of Tom Parker, Alabama Supreme Court 
candidate, as one of “rein[ing] in ‘judicial activism’” on the heels of public protest following the 
removal of Chief Justice Roy Moore for ignoring a federal court order to remove a monument 
of the Ten Commandments from the state Judicial Building); Richard Ruelas, Judge 
Unexpectedly Targeted in Political Campaign, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1B (discussing 
the tactics of a conservative Arizona political group intended to send a message to judges who 
are perceived as “trying to legislate increased abortion access and gay marriage from the 
bench”); Joan Vennochi, Was Gay Marriage Kerry’s Undoing?, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, 
at A15 (suggesting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court played a role in John 
Kerry’s presidential loss as a result of its approval of same-sex marriage during his 
campaign). 
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unwilling or unable to safeguard individual rights or apply the law 
in a reasonable manner to difficult factual situations.2 
The purpose of this essay is to make a plea that we lay aside such 
strident rhetoric and approach the issue of the appropriate degree of 
judicial discretion from an institutional perspective.  This essay 
suggests that neither extreme is a viable jurisprudential model from 
an institutional standpoint.  Instead, the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of both our legislative and judicial institutions must be 
taken into account to find a middle ground with regard to judicial 
activism.  Inherent in the idea of a middle ground is the need to 
accept that some degree of judicial activism is appropriate and 
necessary.  The key difficulty, once this is agreed upon, is 
determining how to regulate judicial behavior to limit exercises of 
judicial activism to situations where it is institutionally beneficial.  
This essay maintains that internal constraints on judicial behavior 
can be used to effectively regulate judicial activism, but that this is 
only possible if steps can be taken to prevent politicizing the 
judiciary and to increase cohesion and consensus within the ranks 
of the judiciary itself.  The theme for this symposium is issues 
facing the judiciary.  This essay respectfully suggests that finding 
ways to foster judicial cohesion and consensus is one of the most 
important, and difficult, issues facing the judiciary today. 
II. THE FUNCTION OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
Before discussing the proper role for judicial activism, it is first 
necessary to examine the function of the legal system and law itself.  
The law gives us order and rules by which we regulate the actions of 
individuals and channel activity to promote societal goals.  To 
achieve these ends, the law must be both respected and obeyed.  
That is, the ‘Rule of Law’ must obtain.  This concept dates back to 
Aristotle, who said that the law strives to be “reason unaffected by  
 
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 
638–39 (1999) (defining “formalism” as “an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in . . . 
that it does not depend on moral or political values of particular judges, and also deductive, 
in . . . that judges decide cases mechanically on the basis of preexisting law and do not 
exercise discretion in individual cases.”).  See also Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judging Judges 
Judging, 48 HOW. L.J. 459, 484–89 (2004) (reviewing MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF THE 
IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: HOW THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS (2003)) (remarking that 
the view of judges as mere automatons necessarily fails to account for the fact that judges are 
products of their various experiences and make decisions based thereupon). 
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desire.”3  While the Rule of Law is the centerpiece of a democratic 
society, there is surprisingly little agreement about its exact nature 
or how to achieve it.4  The Rule of Law, in theory, can merely refer 
to a system where legal rules are uniformly adhered to and equally 
applied to all citizens.5  But in a democratic society, individual 
obedience to the law requires more than mere fear of punishment 
for violations.  For the law to serve as an effective constraint on 
behavior, members of a society must respect the substance of the 
laws and the process by which they are created and enforced.6  This 
condition of respect for, and obedience to, the law will be referred to 
as the existence of the Rule of Law in a society.7 
A. Establishing the Rule of Law—Promoting the Goals of  
Equality, Uniformity and Predictability 
In a common formulation, the Rule of Law is characterized by 
laws that are equally, uniformly and predictably applied.  For 
purposes of this essay, it will be assumed that these goals are 
 
3 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1287a:31–32 (B. Jowett trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 1986, 2042–43 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
4 See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. 
L. REV. 227, 231–35 (2002) (suggesting that a rule of law, distinct from the “Rule-of-Law-not-
of-men” ideal that has led some to declare the Rule of Law an impossibility, can be realized 
through the subjectivity of those who create, interpret, and administer the law). 
5 See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAW Q. REV. 195 (1977), reprinted in 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 212–14 (1979) 
(noting that the Rule of Law—in its original, literal sense—“has two aspects: (1) that people 
should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should be such that people will be 
able to be guided by it.”). 
6 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 807–08 
(1989) (recognizing that a community’s distaste for, and eventual disobedience of, a rule 
prevents the continued existence of that rule). 
7 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the Rule of Law, see RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11–13 (1985) (identifying and discussing, generally, two competing 
ideals of the Rule of Law: the “‘rule-book’ conception” and the “‘rights’ conception”); LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing eight procedural demands 
for creating and maintaining legal rules, and noting that failure to abide by any one of them 
results in an absence of the Rule of Law); Radin, supra note 6, at 783–92 (explaining the two 
primary, distinct conceptions of the Rule of Law: instrumental and substantive); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235–43 (1971) (studying and understanding the Rule of Law in 
the context of a legal system); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE 
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 12–16 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 
1987) (criticizing both Fuller and Dworkin’s models as overly idealistic given that they 
assume judges can divorce their opinions “from the normative and political context within 
which [their] ratiocinations take place”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36–38 (1997) (summarizing the 
four Rule of Law ideal types, and suggesting “that the Rule of Law, in its most idealized form, 
should be conceived as conjoining elements emphasized by each”); Robert S. Summers, The 
Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1693–95 (1999) (outlining 
numerous principles of the rule of law recognized in Western legal systems). 
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necessary, but not sufficient, elements of the Rule of Law8.  These 
characteristics and their relevance to this discussion are briefly 
outlined in the remainder of this section. 
The first requirement of the Rule of Law is equal treatment.  
Applying the law equally to all citizens demonstrates the fairness 
and impartiality of the legal system.  Since the system is not subject 
to manipulation by the rich and powerful, average citizens are more 
inclined to respect and obey the law themselves. 
The second component of the Rule of Law is uniformity.  
Agreement among different judges regarding the meaning of a 
particular law promotes the public’s belief in the law’s rationality 
and encourages public reliance on the fixed meaning.  Conversely, 
judicial disagreement regarding a statute’s meaning instantly 
generates unequal treatment between similarly situated persons 
and delays arriving at a settled interpretation of the law. 
The third characteristic of the Rule of Law is predictability.  
Predictability encourages citizens to plan their affairs in conformity 
with the law to society’s benefit.  If citizen reliance on the law is 
frustrated by unanticipated judicial interpretations, then faith in, 
and respect for, the law is diminished.  The use of strict statutory 
construction arguably creates an environment in which both the 
judiciary and the public can more quickly understand the import of 
statutory language. 
B. Facilitating Democracy—Ensuring the Law Reflects Its 
Society 
Under the above approach to the Rule of Law, individuals can be 
protected from the arbitrary application of the law, while at the 
same time suffering from the creation of unjust laws.  Thus, a 
dictatorship could exemplify the Rule of Law as long as the 
dictator’s whims are clearly stated and enforced without regard to 
the violator’s social or political status.  Typically, however—and as 
used in this essay—the Rule of Law is thought to include 
safeguarding individual liberties from the arbitrary use of 
government power.  The laws themselves must be just.  The Rule of  
 
8 These elements are necessary but not sufficient since, as discussed in the next section, 
for the Rule of Law to truly exist there must also be a general respect for the law that grows 
out of the fact that the laws actually reflect shared societal values.  See discussion infra Part 
II.B. 
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Law therefore requires the populace to freely accept the law, in 
addition to requiring that the law be fairly and impartially applied.  
In its most basic formulation, the Rule of Law represents a state 
where the law fairly communicates the will of society and society’s 
members respect the law’s expression of that will.  Phrased so 
generally, the concept is not only uncontroversial, but is central to 
the existence of a democracy. 
An important corollary to the requirement that the Rule of Law 
only exists when citizens believe that the law appropriately reflects 
societal values is that the law really only has meaning in its 
particular societal context.9  Further, since society is constantly 
evolving, it is imperative that the institutions of government work 
to facilitate the law’s adaptation to its ever-changing societal 
context.10  With this understanding of the operation of the Rule of 
Law, and the goal of the legal institutions of government in 
fostering it, this essay can fruitfully turn to an examination of the 
appropriateness of judicial activism. 
III. THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM CONTROVERSY 
A. Constraining Judges from “Making” Law—The Case for  
Strict Statutory Construction 
While the case against judicial activism takes many forms, for 
purposes of illustration, the “New Textualism”11 of Justice Scalia 
 
9 See John Dewey, Untitled Essay, in MY PHILOPSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN 
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 73, 76–77 (1941) (“[L]aw is through and through a social phenomenon; 
social in origin, in purpose or end, and in application.”); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 18–19, 695 (2d ed. 1985) (declaring “[t]he law, after all, is a mirror held up 
against life,” and “when we call law ‘archaic,’ we mean that the power system of its society is 
morally out of tune”); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994) (“[l]aw is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving 
to solve the basic problems of social living . . . ”); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 109–10 (1977): 
[The function of law] is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light 
of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a 
general consensus among us.  If the assumption is wrong, if there is no consensus, then 
we are headed for war, civil strife, and revolution, and the orderly administration of 
justice will become an irrelevant, nostalgic whimsy until the social fabric has been 
stitched together again and a new consensus has emerged. 
Id.  
10 Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical 
Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 142, 144–45 (2004).  
11 The phrase “New Textualism” was first used by Professor William Eskridge to describe 
Justice Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (1990). 
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represents a well-articulated attack and means of addressing the 
perceived concern.  The New Textualism is premised on the belief 
that strict statutory construction is required to promote the Rule of 
Law.12 
In particular, as discussed above, a legal system is said to 
exemplify the Rule of Law if it promotes the goals of equality, 
uniformity and predictability.13  The linchpin to Justice Scalia’s 
approach to the Rule of Law is that judges must, in fact, be able to 
find only a single interpretation of the law and enunciate it in a 
clear and defensible fashion for these three characteristics to exist.14  
Uniformity among judges requires that they discern the same 
meaning for the same law, divorced from the facts of the particular 
case in point.  To ensure equal treatment, the judge must be able to 
state clearly for the public the rule being applied.  Predictability 
requires that not only judges, but also the public itself, be able to 
discern and anticipate the uniform meaning that ultimately will be 
given to a particular statute.  Therefore, to make this interpretation 
of the Rule of Law possible, Justice Scalia limits judicial discretion 
to a highly constrained mode of statutory interpretation—New 
Textualism.  This theory emphasizes adhering literally to the plain 
meaning of the statutory language and rejects undertaking any 
analysis of other sources of interpretive authority that otherwise 
might lead reasonable minds to differ regarding meaning.15 
 
12 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182–
83, 1185, 1187 (1989) (insisting that there must be at least some basis in the text upon which 
general rules of law are based). 
13 See discussion supra Part II.A; Scalia, supra note 12, at 1176–79, 1182–83 (arguing that, 
in deciding cases, judges must apply general rules, formulated from constitutional and 
statutory text, rather than rely on the facts of the particular case, in order to foster equality, 
uniformity and predictability in the law). 
14 See id. at 1182–84 (asserting that the ability to deduce a “precise [and] principled” 
statement of the law is “the essence of the judicial craft”). 
Of course, the extent to which one can elaborate general rules from a statutory or 
constitutional command depends considerably upon how clear and categorical one 
understands the command to be, which in turn depends considerably upon one’s method 
of textual exegesis.  For example, it is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges to 
develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning 
of a text. 
Id. at 1183–84. 
15 While New Textualism focuses primarily on divining “the intent that a reasonable 
person would gather from the text of the law,” in some limited situations even New 
Textualism deigns to broaden its inquiry.  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-
Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  Thus, it is 
permissible to construe the text of a law in its statutory context to prevent ascribing a 
meaning contradicted by other parts of the statute itself.  Id. at 16, 20–21.  It is also 
permissible for a court to correct mere “scrivener’s error[s]” in interpreting a statute.  Id. at 
20–21.  Additionally, in rare circumstances where there is a “solid indication in the text or 
structure of the statute that something other than ordinary meaning was intended[,]” the 
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Unfortunately, as a result, New Textualism severely limits the 
discretion of judges to interpret the law consonantly with the views 
of society.16  The literal text of the statute is thought to have a fixed 
meaning from which judges are not free to stray.  In this view, 
judges should essentially be faithful agents, implementing the 
decisions that the legislature has arrived at as properly reflecting 
societal values.  Thus, New Textualism advocates strict statutory 
interpretation as a means of reducing judicial activism—thereby 
realizing the Rule of Law—but does so at the expense of allowing 
the judiciary any role in molding the law to fit difficult or 
unanticipated situations.  This approach places the entire burden of 
adapting the law to society’s values upon the legislature.  As 
discussed below, while this is the primary institutional role of the 
legislature, and the judiciary is generally not well-placed to make 
broad policy-oriented decisions for society, as an institutional 
matter, the legislature is ill-suited to carry this entire burden 
alone.17 
B. Encouraging Judges to “Adapt” Law—The Case for Open-
Ended Statutory Construction 
The historic strength of the American judiciary has been the 
creation of common law through incremental case-by-case 
adjudication.  While Justice Scalia maintains that this common law  
 
plain meaning of a statute can be modified by a court.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  In Scalia’s view the proper approach to 
statutory interpretation is to: 
first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using 
established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some 
permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.  If not—and especially if a 
good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that ordinary meaning. 
Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Even when the ordinary meaning of the text is found to be 
contrary to the remainder of the statutory scheme, however, New Textualism maintains that 
the appropriate meaning is still to be ascertained by reference to the statute as a whole—in 
light of its plain meaning and statutory context—rather than by an analysis of the statute’s 
legislative history or other evidence.  See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 
504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (proffering that even when a text’s 
ordinary meaning is absurd, legislative history and other evidence may only be used to 
confirm that the legislature did not conceive of the result, and may not be used to develop the 
actual meaning of the text).  Consequently, even in the limited circumstances when New 
Textualism departs from the ordinary meaning of a statutory text, it refuses to permit 
extratextual values or authorities to inform the statute’s meaning. 
16 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 638–39 (noting that “formalism,” as “an interpretive 
strategy,” denies judges discretion to “make exceptions” to existing law or “allow meaning to 
change over time”). 
17 See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
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tradition is of little relevance given the statutory, constitutional and 
precedential restraints on our modern-day judicial system, others 
believe there is still much room for courts to adapt and mold the law 
to fit specific factual situations.18  By giving the judiciary a freer 
hand in applying the law, judges can adapt statutes to better 
effectuate legislative intent and ameliorate unintended 
consequences in certain factual situations.  In this way, the 
judiciary helps to ensure that the law appropriately reflects societal 
values.  Further, accepting a broader role for the judiciary in 
interpreting statutes also provides an important safety valve 
against short-sighted majority excesses that do not properly weigh 
long-term societal interests. 
While the primary institutional role of the judiciary is to 
adjudicate specific cases and ensure that society’s laws are evenly 
and fairly enforced, those advocating a broader interpretive role for 
the judiciary believe that courts must also create and adapt the law 
to properly perform their function.  The risk, however, is that 
particular judges routinely disregard the will of society and the 
legislature in favor of unilaterally imposing their personal views on 
an unwilling populace. 
IV. THE ROOT OF THE CONTROVERSY—HOW BEST TO REFLECT 
SOCIETY’S VALUES 
This essay asserts that the crux of the disagreement between 
strict interpretationists—who are fearful of judicial activism—and 
open interpretationists—who embrace judicial activism—concerns 
how best to reflect the desires and values of society in the law.  A 
central tenet of New Textualism is that judges cannot be trusted 
with any power to create law since this role should be the sole 
province of the legislature.19  At the other extreme, the argument 
can be made that the judiciary must have complete latitude in 
creating law to protect the rights of political minorities from 
majoritarian excesses and permit judges to act as the conscience of 
society.  This section will discuss these positions from an 
institutional perspective and argue that neither extreme represents 
an acceptable institutional solution.  Instead, a middle ground,  
 
18 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 1176–80. 
19 While there is a separation of powers aspect to this argument, this essay focuses 
exclusively on New Textualism’s argument that democratic and other institutional concerns 
require denying any lawmaking function to the judiciary.  For a discussion and rebuttal of 
New Textualism’s separation of powers argument, see Lavoie, supra note 10, at 163–67. 
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where the judiciary is allowed some degree of lawmaking authority, 
but is also subject to constraints on the exercise of this authority, 
represents the best overall solution from an institutional 
perspective. 
A. The Institutional Limits of the Legislature 
Since New Textualism forecloses the judiciary from considering 
societal values when interpreting statutes, the law is less easily 
adapted to its societal context under this approach.20  Since courts 
are prohibited from inserting societal values into the law, this 
burden must be shouldered entirely by the legislature.  This is an 
institutional burden that the legislature is ill-equipped to bear 
alone.  To the extent that the legislature fails in shouldering this 
burden, society’s laws will become increasingly isolated from its 
collective values, and the public will begin to recognize that the law 
is no longer serving its desired societal function.  As a result, 
citizens will become disenchanted with the entire legal system and 
the Rule of Law will be undermined. 
In the first instance, the legislature is charged with reflecting 
society’s values when it drafts the law.  Legislatures are 
democratically elected bodies that are institutionally well-suited to 
deliberate over issues facing society.  They can debate all the 
arguments, canvas their constituents, and consult with divergent 
interest groups and experts.  Ultimately, legislative decisions are 
normally the product of delicately negotiated compromises between 
various interest groups.  However, this does not mean that the 
legislature will always arrive at laws that appropriately reflect the 
values of a society.  Legislatures can be strongly influenced by 
powerful minority interest groups and well-funded lobbyists.  
Similarly, a political party in control of the administrative functions 
of the legislature may use issue control and other parliamentary 
maneuvers to adopt legislation that, in fact, represents a minority 
position within the broader society.  Consequently, it is by no means 
clear that delegating sole authority to the legislature for inserting 
societal values into the law is the best institutional approach. 
 
20 This is not to imply that a legal system based on strict judicial construction is 
theoretically impossible.  For instance, if the institutions of government facilitated the rapid 
creation and revision of society’s laws, the laws could be kept in tune with society’s values 
without the need for the judiciary to fulfill this role.  However, whether such a system is 
possible in practice is considerably more doubtful, as discussed below. 
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Additionally, New Textualism’s refusal to look beyond a statute’s 
literal words presents the legislature with a Sisyphean task.  For 
instance, if a law containing only general principles is enacted, a 
literalist judiciary will either strike the law down for vagueness or 
enforce it strictly as drafted, thereby covering many specific 
situations that the legislature did not intend to cover.  Conversely, 
if a detailed and narrowly crafted statute is enacted, individuals 
will devise methods to thwart the legislature’s purpose without 
violating the specific provisions of the narrowly drafted statute.  
Since a literalist judiciary will refuse to narrow a general statute or 
extend a specific one to comport with societal and legislative 
purposes, the legislature faces the impossible task of drafting its 
legislation with every conceivable situation in mind.  Since 
statutory language inevitably will prove insufficient, the legislature 
must continually and constantly revise its laws to ensure that 
society’s goals are not frustrated.  With so much legislative effort 
devoted to maintaining prior laws from such attacks, new societal 
concerns may go unaddressed for want of legislative resources. 
Additionally, the legislature’s constant revision of the law is likely 
to create rules so convoluted, specific, and complex that the average 
citizen simply despairs of ever understanding them.  Such a 
situation breeds contempt for the law and raises concerns about 
equal treatment.  Those who are well-advised by teams of attorneys 
can be expected to uncover technical gaps enabling them to “legally” 
avoid the law.  The average citizen will assume that the complexity 
of the law is being exploited by the rich and powerful in this 
manner.  When the law ceases to become understandable, and court 
decisions make literalist interpretations that society views as 
contrary to its desires, respect for the law evaporates.21 
Further, even when the legislature is able to promptly amend the 
law to close particular loopholes, it is, in effect, encouraging the 
unethical acts that prompted the amendment.  By implicitly 
rewarding those who are the first to discover and exploit 
unintended consequences in the law, strict interpretation creates a 
dynamic where citizens rush to undertake unethical actions to gain 
an advantage over competitors.22  This rush to the bottom promotes  
 
21 See, e.g., William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1181, 1187 (1992) (concluding that Justice 
Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation is likely to “attract[] public disrespect rather 
than provid[e] the public with a reassuring image of the judicial process.”). 
22 Of course, the legislature might try to stem this problem by enacting retroactive laws, 
but this itself would defeat one of New Textualism’s main concerns about the Rule of Law—
that it be predictable. 
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the belief that unethical action pays, and leads to the perception 
that the law itself is fundamentally unjust.  It also creates an 
environment where uncertainties in the law will be uncovered and 
exploited quickly, thus putting the legislature under even greater 
pressure to keep revising the law to remedy each new loophole 
discovered. 
By refusing to apply reason to the interpretation of statutory text, 
the judiciary validates the right of the well-advised to circumvent 
the law’s intent by artifice and the identification of technical 
loopholes.  Abdication of the judicial role of a fair interpreter of the 
law results in making the law not only unaffected by desire, but also 
unaffected by reason.23  Detaching the law from its societal context 
leads to an increase in unethical action and public disenchantment 
with the legal system.  Consequently, while the legislature has the 
primary role in interpreting societal desires and values, it should 
not be made to carry this burden alone.  By giving the judiciary a 
role in closing statutory gaps and aligning the law with societal 
values and legislative intent, the legislature can function more 
efficiently, and society’s need for laws that are in line with its 
values can be more efficiently satisfied. 
B. The Legitimacy Problems of the Judiciary 
The foregoing section demonstrated that, from an institutional 
perspective, the judiciary should be permitted some lawmaking 
authority to help further societal interests and ease the 
unmanageable burden that would otherwise be placed on the 
legislature.  Nevertheless, lawmaking is not the primary function of 
the judiciary.  Rather, the judicial function is one focused primarily 
on ensuring that the law is fairly and uniformly applied in 
particular factual situations.  This incremental method of decision-
making is at the very heart of the common law system.  
Institutionally, the judiciary performs best when acting pursuant to 
the facts of a particular case to ensure that justice is done. 
Conversely, courts are typically not well-suited to consider broad 
policy matters regarding societal values and decisions.  First, the 
judiciary only considers the issues presented to it.  Consequently, a 
particular court may lack the information and access to different 
viewpoints that would be necessary to reach a sound interpretation  
 
23 As mentioned above, Aristotle believed and proclaimed that “[t]he law is reason 
unaffected by desire.”  ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 2042–43. 
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of societal values.  The judiciary does not hold debates or consult 
outside experts on its own initiative.  Second, the typical nature of 
the judicial inquiry is to choose between the positions presented by 
the litigants.  As a result, courts lack the ability to arrive at the 
type of negotiated compromise over the scope of the law that usually 
results from legislative action.  Finally, in many cases, the judiciary 
is not subject to direct democratic control.  That is, to the extent 
that judges are appointed rather than democratically elected, they 
may not be as sensitive to the popular will, and thus may hold views 
not reflective of society as a whole. 
Thus, while the judiciary needs some ability to actively inject 
societal values into the law, it is not institutionally positioned to 
take on this role as its primary function.  The judiciary does best in 
this realm when it constrains its interpretations to filling gaps in a 
statutory framework.  This relieves the legislature of the burden of 
drafting foolproof statutory language and generally promotes 
respect for the spirit of the law by citizens who are reassured that 
the courts will act as the caretaker of the societal values embodied 
in the law.  Similarly, the courts also appropriately exercise 
lawmaking power when they act to protect against short-term 
majoritarian excesses, or to foster experimentation on issues that 
lack public consensus. 
In short, there is a line that needs to be maintained regarding the 
appropriate level and circumstances for exercising judicial activism.  
When judges make decisions motivated by their own personal 
beliefs and actions, they are usurping an institutional role for which 
they are ill-suited.  When judges totally eschew activism, citizens 
are incentivized to exploit statutory gaps and the Rule of Law 
begins to break down because the legislature is incapable of 
shouldering the full burden alone.  The result of this institutional 
analysis is that we should structure our jurisprudence in such a 
way that the legislative and judicial institutions work together to 
achieve laws that are in line with what society is truly valuing at 
the time. 
C. The Nature of a Balanced “Middle Ground” for Judicial 
Activism 
While a legitimate debate could be pursued regarding the exact 
parameters of an ideal middle ground for judicial activism, this 
essay will set forth a baseline position that would attain more 
systemically optimal results than either of the extreme positions  
2005] Activist or Automaton 623 
regarding judicial activism.  In this suggested middle ground, the 
legislature would be charged with making the law based on policies 
and political compromises that further overall societal interests and 
values.  Ideally, the legislature would approach this task by 
adopting general, standards-based provisions, yet not engage in 
overly technical legislation that attempts to delineate every 
conceivable situation.  The legislature should be comfortable in 
taking this approach since the judiciary is charged with applying 
the law in a manner that fills in any technical gaps and implements 
the societal choices made by the legislature.24  The courts then are 
the guardians of the fair application of the law by acting to fill gaps 
and put flesh on the statutory framework. 
This approach achieves a number of goals.  It ensures that the 
law is always adaptive and dealing with unanticipated applications 
and consequences.  It ensures that justice is done and creates faith 
in the common citizen that the system works fairly to implement 
shared societal values.  It facilitates a self-adjusting set of laws, 
such that the legal system will achieve laws that are in line with 
what society is valuing overall. 
However, judicial activism should not be solely limited to this 
type of gap-filling role.  There are certain situations where courts 
must take a more activist role for the good of society.  For instance, 
certain laws adopted by a legislature may be struck down by a court 
as not in accord with broader, typically constitutionally-based, long-
term societal values.  Thus, it is appropriate for courts to assume an 
anti-majoritarian role when necessary to protect the constitutional 
rights of political minorities.  Additionally, the nature of the 
adjudicative function may insert the courts into controversial areas 
where no societal consensus exists.  In such circumstances, a court 
may well be forced to rule in an area where there is no legislative 
guidance, or where existing guidance is arguably no longer 
representative due to society’s evolving culture.  In such situations 
it is appropriate for the judiciary to further the development of the 
law by crafting a solution to a particular case despite lively debate 
concerning the issue generally.  That is, the judiciary can serve to 
further such debate.  Such controversial judicial decisions are likely 
to be the topic of active debate in the legislature, which will then 
need to face an issue that it has perhaps eschewed.  In this way, the  
 
24 It should be noted that administrative agencies of the executive branch may also bear 
part of this interpretive burden for the legislature.  Given the focus of this symposium on 
issues facing the judiciary, this essay does not explore this interplay between the legislative 
and executive functions. 
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judicial decision can be the starting point for a dialogue between the 
branches of government regarding the topic—allowing for an 
incremental give and take between the branches as laws are made, 
interpreted, and modified.  Such incrementalism can be beneficial to 
society in limiting the speed with which changes occur in the law 
until a true societal consensus emerges regarding the issue. 
V. SAFEGUARDING THE RULE OF LAW UNDER A “MIDDLE GROUND” 
APPROACH 
This essay has asserted that based on institutional strengths, a 
middle ground position should be taken regarding judicial activism.  
That is, judges should be permitted to make and adapt the law in 
certain situations as a matter of overall institutional efficiency.  
This view permits the interplay of the judicial function with the 
implementation of societal values.  It approaches the law as a fluid 
concept constantly adapting to society; and therefore judges must 
facilitate the ability of the law to reflect its changing cultural 
context.  As Professor Radin states: 
judges are an interpretive community conscious of their 
obligation to act as independent moral choosers for the good 
of a society, in light of what that society is and can become.  
The law, as long as it is part of a viable and developing 
community, is neither “found” nor “made,” but continuously 
re-interpreted.  There are still rules.  But there are no rules 
that can be understood apart from their context; nor are 
there rules that can be understood as fixed in time.25 
However, this position is directly contrary to the assumption of 
New Textualism that the Rule of Law cannot exist if judges are 
given any lawmaking function.  New Textualism’s attack on judicial 
activism focuses on the alleged inability of a legal system with 
activist judges to maintain equality, uniformity and predictability in 
the law.  This essay maintains that these concerns can largely be 
addressed in a manner that both promotes the Rule of Law and 
recognizes a legitimate role for judicial consideration of society’s 
values.  This section focuses on the New Textualist concerns and 
how they can be addressed by fostering greater cohesion and 
consensus within the judiciary itself. 
 
25 Radin, supra note 6, at 817.  
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A. Achieving Equality, Uniformity and Predictability through 
Institutional Consensus 
New Textualism maintains that equality, uniformity and 
predictability are essential elements for promoting the Rule of Law.  
These three concepts are closely linked and share a similar aim: to 
cause every judge to reach similar results in similar cases based on 
similar rationales.  New Textualism achieves this goal by limiting 
judicial interpretation to the plain meaning of the literal statutory 
language.  While injustice may result because judges are denied the 
ability to tailor the law to particular facts, New Textualism’s 
approach imposes similar results in all cases based on a 
standardized determination of the plain meaning of the statute.  
However, this is not the only means of achieving this end. 
The key to designing a judicial system that appreciates its social 
context, while still substantially complying with the need for 
equality, uniformity and predictability, is to ensure that the system 
promotes genuine consensus among judges regarding the 
appropriate result for any particular case.26  If most judges would 
agree on the proper application of the law to a particular fact 
pattern based on an examination of all the relevant information 
(including societal context), then equality, uniformity and 
predictability would be maintained, while the injustice of an 
inflexible rule would be avoided.  Where the relevant judicial 
institutions create an interpretive community sharing similar 
values and approaches to legal interpretation, individual beliefs will 
be sufficiently constrained by reason and peer scrutiny, allowing 
substantial consensus to emerge.27  Such a judicial system achieves 
true equality, uniformity and predictability in the law by 
constraining the passions and motives of individual judges from 
within the judiciary, rather than giving the mere semblance of 
eliminating such motives by imposing a New Textualist artificial  
 
26 Note that this requirement is distinct from the statement that one should “‘[t]reat like 
cases alike and different cases differently.’”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).  
That statement is a justification for obeying past precedent by requiring that similar fact 
patterns receive the treatment previously applied under the law, but different facts can 
warrant departures from a prior rule.  As such, the statement sidesteps the question of how 
one is to determine whether the addition or subtraction of a particular fact actually 
constitutes a significant difference.  Id. at 155–56. 
27 Such general consensus was thought to exist within the context of the English common 
law.  See id. at 131–32.  Professor Bruner has asserted that the force leading to such general 
consensus in the common law was the shared understanding of the implicit moral precepts on 
which the law is ultimately based.  See Jerome Bruner, Psychology, Morality, and the Law, in 
SOCIAL DISCOURSE AND MORAL JUDGMENT 99, 101–02, 105 (Daniel N. Robinson ed., 1992). 
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uniformity over all cases. 
The American judicial system is institutionally positioned to 
produce consensus around its decisions.28  Consensus is 
institutionally promoted by: (1) requiring published opinions stating 
the judges’ reasoning so that it can be openly scrutinized, criticized 
and ultimately overruled or accepted by society; (2) requiring that 
decisions be grounded on the facts of the particular situation, prior 
precedents, accepted legal principles and the statutory text, thus 
ensuring that the law’s evolution is well-considered; and (3) 
ensuring that the judges themselves share a common 
understanding of their role and how they are to reach their 
decisions. 
The first two criteria are well-established in American 
jurisprudence and are considered hallmarks of the common law 
system.29  However, the third requirement necessitates that judges 
agree on the correct mode of statutory interpretation.  As New 
Textualism gains strength, the judicial schism over statutory 
interpretation becomes a threat to the system’s traditional ability to 
reach consensus regarding legal meaning.  Two judges examining 
the same case are more likely to reach dissimilar conclusions if one 
is bound to examine only the literal words of the relevant statute, 
while the other feels free to factor in societal values and statutory 
purpose.  Thus, creating continued cohesion and consensus is a 
major challenge facing the judiciary today. 
B. Meeting the Challenge of Fostering a Cohesive Judiciary 
From an institutional perspective, a limited degree of judicial 
activism is a crucial ingredient for an effective legal system.  While 
the appropriate degree of activism can be regulated internally via a  
 
28 Popkin, supra note 21, at 1170 (“Courts are in a good position to apply public values to 
the resolution of disputes because . . . their process of reflective thought and collegial dialogue 
gives them a unique opportunity to work out the implications of public values.”). 
29 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10, 14, 18–
23, 149 (1922) (discussing the nature of common law adjudication, and the function of judicial 
precedent and the judge’s individual role within this process); Larry Alexander, Constrained 
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (stating: “The notion that courts ordinarily should 
follow precedent in deciding cases is one of the core structural features of adjudication in 
common-law legal systems”); Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial 
Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 810–11 (1961) (discussing how the opinion writing process 
is in part the function of the law, and how this process should produce predictable and 
justifiable opinions if the process is functioning properly); Jon O. Newman, Between Legal 
Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 
205 (1984) (arguing that the careful scrutiny given to court opinions promotes objective, 
rational thought by judges rather than imposition of their personal preferences). 
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shared consensus regarding their role within a professional 
judiciary, the judiciary is currently in crisis.  New Textualism has 
created a schism regarding the appropriate mode of statutory 
interpretation.  Additionally, the political process has increased the 
role of partisanship in the selection of judges at all levels.30  This 
has resulted in a highly factionalized judiciary that is less cordial in 
its internal relations and less likely to respect its independent 
institutional role as a professional community charged with 
responsibility for enforcing the law in an equal, uniform and 
predictable manner.31  Creating a judiciary that values internal 
discourse and is respectful of other viewpoints is a crucial element 
in forging overall consensus among judges. 
This then is the conundrum facing the judiciary: the current 
political system, in the name of promoting the Rule of Law or 
protecting individual liberties (depending on your political leaning), 
is creating deep divisions in the judiciary that ultimately result in a 
less equal, uniform and predictable application of the law, and 
expose judges acting with an institutionally appropriate level of 
judicial activism to charges of inappropriate decisions.  It also 
relaxes the internal institutional constraints that would otherwise 
prevent individual judges from engaging in unwarranted levels of 
judicial activism, and therefore allows certain judges to act on their 
personal biases and, in fact, to engage in institutionally 
counterproductive types of judicial activism. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this essay is not to offer a panacea for the difficult 
situation the judiciary is facing.  Rather, the purpose here is to 
bring forth the real issues and separate the political rhetoric from 
the institutional realities.  If our government is to act as intended—
with appropriate checks and balances on the power of other 
branches, and effective methods for ensuring that the law is kept in  
 
30 This is true on both ends of the political spectrum, with Democrats often using a judge’s 
views on abortion or other issues as a litmus test for qualification and Republicans promoting 
only the most socially conservative and strongly textualist jurists. 
31 For a study of the effects of political ideology and panel composition on judicial voting, 
see Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary 
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004), concluding: 
Because of the disciplining effect of precedent, and because judges do not radically 
disagree with one another, there is significant commonality across political parties.  But 
in the most difficult areas, the ones where the law is unclear or in flux, both party and 
panel effects are large enough to be a source of serious concern. 
Id. at 348. 
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line with societal values—then there must be an acceptance that 
judicial activism is neither an unmitigated evil or an unassailable 
good.  Instead, judicial activism is an important element in 
maintaining the overall balance and efficiency of our form of 
government.  It must be appropriately constrained, but it must also 
be acknowledged as a necessary judicial tool.  This essay is a plea to 
all parties to tone down their rhetoric and return to an age where 
jurists were selected based on legal acumen rather than politics. 
 
